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C E N T R A L   I N T E L L I G E N C E   A G E N C Y

11 May 1951

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-36: BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR  
SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT REGIME (As agreed to by  
IAC Representatives)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for the present non-Communist regime to survive insurgent operations with or without direct or indirect Chinese Communist intervention, and to estimate Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions with respect to such intervention.

ASSUMPTION

Continuation of warfare in Korea.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. STABILITY AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE BURMESE GOVERNMENT

- OIR                    A. Stability of the regime.
- Defense (G-2)        B. Size, combat effectiveness and political reliability  
                              of military forces.
- Defense (G-2)        C. Capabilities of military forces against individual  
                              and combined insurgent operations, and against direct  
                              Chinese Communist invasion.

OIR                    II. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF THE BURMESE INSURGENTS

- Defense (G-2)        A. Present capabilities and objectives of individual  
                              insurgent forces.
- B. Present and future possibilities for combined anti-  
                              government action by insurgent forces.
1. Extent of present cooperation, if any.
2. Extent of willingness to cooperate.
3. Capabilities for combined insurgent operations.
- C. Chinese Communist aid.
1. Degree and nature of aid or control which in-  
                                  surgent forces would seek or accept.

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2. Present nature and level of Chinese Communist assistance to insurgent groups.
3. Effect of present levels of aid on insurgent capabilities.
4. Probable effect of higher levels of aid upon insurgent capabilities.

Defense  
(G-2)

III. CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO INTERVENE  
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY

- A. Chinese Communist capabilities to provide materiel and technical assistance.
  1. Nature and extent of assistance available.
  2. Capabilities to deliver materiel.
- B. Capabilities of the Chinese Communists to provide military forces, assuming present commitments elsewhere.

OIR  
Defense  
(G-2)

IV. CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS TOWARD BURMA

- A. Chinese Communist objectives; probable nature of any Chinese-Soviet agreements regarding Burma.
- B. Effect, if any, of war in Korea on Chinese Communist intentions.

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- C. Effect of the presence of KMT troops in Burma on Chinese Communist intentions.
- D. Relative importance of Burma in Chinese Communist calculations.
- E. Probable present plans and tactics.

OIR  
Defense (G-2) V.

CONCLUSIONS AS TO PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT  
BURMESE REGIME

- A. Against insurgent forces alone.
- B. Against insurgent forces with indirect Chinese Communist aid.
- C. Against insurgent forces with direct Chinese Communist aid.

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